Two levels of normative evaluation in bioethics with respect to principlism

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the extension of the concept of normative and non-normative ethics in principlism. We draw on the eighth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress. We point out the problem of the vagueness of the definition of the theory of principlism. We present the basic concepts and point out their criticisms. As well, we briefly present their possible defenses. We then offer our own interpretation of the critique of principlism on the basis of which we offer a compromise account of the dual process of normative evaluation in bioethics. We illustrate this conception by distinguishing between manifest and latent uses of normative evaluation. We argue that manifest evaluation is apparent and is concurrent with the principialist grasp of normative ethics. We further argue that latent evaluation is a manifestation of non-normative ethics. We do not regard such dual normative evaluations as necessarily simultaneous processes and argue that there may be discrepancies. We therefore conclude our paper by pointing out that all medical subjects are subject to this double evaluation. We note that there may be situations where a medical subject may be considered both moral and amoral at the same time.